On Order, And the Folly of Centralized PowerEdit
For some considerable length of time now we have lived in a period described, at various points, as the Pax Pacifica. That is, the relative peace and stability brought to the political sphere by the heretofore highly successful political maneuverings of the New Pacific Order. Those well versed in the writings of Vladimir (assuming there are any such persons) will understand that a central goal of the Francoist ideology is the removal of conflict through unification and centralization of power under the sovereign of the Order. To this end, they have been remarkably successful. The Pax Pacifica and the political framework upon which it rests are the most significant diplomatic achievements in the history of the planet. They are also the most profound strategic blunders ever committed.
It must be recognized, of course, that there are a multitude who believe that Francoism is paid lip service by the leadership of the Order rather than truly followed, or that it is not an ideology but is simply defined as whatever definition is in the best interests of the Order for any particular occasion and is therefore worthy of dismissal. To these it must be pointed out that, even if both of the previous statements are indeed true, Francoist thought does share as its origin a number of the same minds and events that crafted the Order itself, and that, further still, if Francoism is only a reflection of what is most convenient for the Order, then a good deal can be surmised about the motivations of the Order at any one time by a review of what Francoism is said to entail and that the manner in which the Order is most prone to operate will carry along lines similar to those used in the formation of the Francoist ideology.
Now, a key point in both Pacifican literature and history is the consolidation of power with the stated intent of protection against any possible threat to their sovereignty. This can be seen in their treatment of the Red Trading Sphere, in their use of diplomacy and in manner in which war is conducted, all culminating in the over-arching strategy of bringing as much of the cyberverse into their sphere of influence as is possible both to create a physical barrier against attack and to remove the potential threat represented by an independent agent with any significant ability to cause harm. The very fact that it has been made nigh impossible to ensure security without becoming a cog in the great political conglomerate of the current era only demonstrates the savvy with which the Pacific has applied itself in the building of its nest.
This political structure that has been built, however, is not monolithic in nature. It entails the incorporation of myriad moving parts, and, as with any machine political or literal, the greater the number of moving parts, the greater the friction they create. The great mass may nominally be assembled under a single banner, but there has been created no unity of purpose. This allows for a great deal of political stress to build where competing goals come into direct conflict without the option of release or separation, for separation would leave the opponent with a great deal more resources than could be brought to bare by one who has broken away from the established order and thus create a great threat to security.
The result is an organization with mounting internal pressure and no release valve. It is an organization with a foundation resting almost solely on desire for protection and as such is inherently unstable in the face of inevitable internal conflict. For the only recourse for an internal conflict is internal maneuvering, and an entity which exists exclusively for the protection of its parts and yet turns at intervals upon those parts is not an entity which is fulfilling its purpose and cannot, therefore, be considered long for this world. The ultimate flaw is that a system in which power is given over in exchange for defense of individual sovereignty as its express purpose is entirely untenable when the degree of sovereignty that must be sacrificed for membership outweighs the potential infringement inflicted by the non-existence of the system.
Not only, in the establishment of the political order, was the underlying focus required for stability entirely ignored, but the effects on participatory alliances was ill-recognized. There is no greater unifier nor catalyst for improvement than adversity survived. In removing an observable challenge, for a great many, the muscles of the organism which is each alliance have begun to atrophy and in many cases discord made its way internally with no external threat to stave it off. While certainly not all, a significant portion of those alliances which have considered themselves most secure have turned to sloth for lack of tribulation. A fine example can be found in the Grand Global Alliance, the sole entity which has managed to position itself outside the realm of defeat in every major war, and yet, or perhaps as a result, finds itself struggling on a fundamental level, whereas alliances like the Mushroom Kingdom have been pushed through constant trials since their inception, the survival of which can be said to have made them truly formidable.
It is as a direct result of these design flaws that we are currently observing a great deal of fracturing in the current political order. Whether this is simply a period of upheaval and restructuring or a complete collapse is yet to be seen. Moving forward, however, it is worth considering the shape that, perhaps, the world should take. For an attempt at complete or near total political unification of the planet has proven to be folly in the extreme. The Order has built a house of cards around itself, unable, itself, to truly move without risk of disrupting all that it has constructed and bringing it to ruin. Their predicament should serve as a warning for the future that the strategies used for such mass unification as we have seen only creates a balancing act where security lies not with personal ability, but with the balancing the world upon a pin and the hope that a slight gust shall not bring the whole toppling down.
It is to the merits of a far more decentralized political base that all should look. In a world without a centralized mass in which all power has been gathered, smaller, more unified independent political entities become a viable option for maintenance of security. Where a monstrous, disjointed bloc is unstable and often undesirable, smaller, tighter organizations can very easily find a unity of purpose, a sense of self, that allows for true cooperation and a much more effective system. By breaking politics down into a variety of factions, it suddenly rests upon an individual's ability to maintain relations with other factions or, as the case may be, establish a defense. While requiring, perhaps, a higher degree of vigilance than participation in a centralized mass, such a system allows for massively expanded freedom of action with less fear of becoming diplomatically isolated. It makes the proposition of defending allies much simpler as one does not have to balance it against the fact that their own future security and prosperity lies with the people doing the attacking, and it makes wanton aggression much less tenable as no single entity has the power to dispatch the combined forces of the rest of the world. In such a world, we give up the illusion of security created by an unstable political mass for the controllable security provided by balanced power.